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NOTE AND COMMENT 
WR:EN TR:E D:ESctNDANTS OF A PR:ED:EC:EAS:ED L:EGAT:Er: WILL NOT TAK:E 
UND:ER A STATUT:E OF SUBSTITUTION.-There are in most states statutes declar-
ing that if a person named as legatee dies before the testator, his descendants 
shall take his share. Downing v. Nicholson, us Ia. 493; Strong v. Smith, 8.4 
Mich. 567; 18 A. & E. ENCYC. OF LAw, 2d Ed. 755. A common type is such 
as is found in the Civil Code of California, sec. 1310, viz.: "When any estate 
is devised or bequeathed to any child or other relation of the testator and the 
devisee or legatee dies before the testator, leaving lineal descendants, such 
descendants take the estate so given by the will in the same mannei" as the 
devisee or legatee would have done had he survived the testator." Under 
this statute the Supreme Court of California has just held (two judges dis-
senting) that descendants of a legatee dying after the will was made, but 
before a codicil confirming it do not take because (1) the statute is one of 
distribution having reference only to conditions existing at the time of 
death of the maker of the will and not to the time of the decease of the 
original legatee, (2) because the republication subsequent to the death of the 
legatee made the lapsed legacy a void legacy, and (3) because the statute 
applied only to lapsed and not to void legacies. In re Matthews' Estate, 
(Calif. 1918), 169 Pac. 233. 
We shall consider these points in their order. Notwithstanding the terms 
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of many of the statutes that gifts shall not lapse, it seems settled in most 
jurisdictions that they do, and that the legatee takes an independent gift by 
force of the statute. Roon ON WILLS, sec. 675; Fisher v. Hill, 7 Mass. 86; 
Mann v. Hyde, 71 Mich. 278; Thompson v. Myer, 95 Ky. 597, and the subject 
of the bequest forms no part of the primary legatee's estate; Cook v. Munn, 
12 Abb. N. C. 344;J01ies v. Jones, 37 Ala. 646;Re Hafner, 45 App. Div 549; 
Smith v. Smith, 5 Jones Eq. (N. C.) 305; Glenn v. "Belt 7 G. & J. (Md.) 362; 
nor is the gift subject to the debt of the primary legatee or devisee to the 
testator; Hemsley v. Hollingsworth, u9 Md. 431; W atte11barger v. Payne, 
162 Mo. App. 434; Carson v. Carson, l Mete. (Ky.), 300. But see Baker v. 
Carpenter, 6g Ohio St 15, Denise v. Denise, 37 N. J. Eq. 163; Tilton et al. v. 
Tilton (Mass. 1907), 82 N. E. 704; Smith v. Williams, 89 Ga. 9, 32 Am. St 
Rep. 67; Cook v. Munn (siipra); Harris v. Harris, 12 Gill and J. (Md.) 474; 
Vogel v. Turnt, uo Md. 192. This is not true of the English statute. The 
English courts have interpreted their statute literally to the effect that the 
deceased legatee is deemed alive until after the death of the testator. The 
descendants then take as heirs of the legatee subject to all the incidents of the 
original gift Johnsen v. Johnson, 3 Hare, 156; Eager v. Furivall, 17 Ch. D. 
n5, and the same is true in Canada. Re. Carter, 20 0. L. R. 127. The effect 
given these statutes by the American authorities shows ~at they are by no 
means placed on the same footing QY the courts as substitution by words of 
the testator in the will by which the substituted legatee takes subject to all the 
incidents of the original gift. Roon ON WILLS, secs. ()gg-702. 
\Vhile it is often said in the American cases that these statutes enter 
into and become a part of the testator's will, the courts were not attempt-
ing to d~termine whether the beneficiary took by virtue of the will or by 
virtue of the .statute alone, or when and in what way the statute took 
effect Yet the cases are so numerous in which these statements are made 
and the language is so explicit that they are entitled to some weight. 
For instance, in Carson v. Carson (supra), the Court said: "The surviving 
issue take the estate devised not as lieirs at law or distributees of the deceased 
devisee but as legatees directly and immediately under and by virtue of the 
will." In Wattenbarger v. Payne (supra) it was said "The legislature enacted 
a law that, in the contingency of the father's death, made his child an original 
legatee of the grandfather. It is everywhere agreed that an applicable statute 
enters into and becomes a part of the testator's will. Therefore, should it not 
be said that the grandfather willed the· legacy to his son, if he be alive at the 
grandfather's decease, but if he be dead then to the children of the son?" 
Many similar statements are to be found in the cases. The doctrine of the 
principal case is inconsistent with all this. It has been held that the statute 
applies to a will made before its passage where the legatee died subsequent 
to its passage. Bishop v. Bishop, 4 Hill (N. Y.) 138; Dazey v. Killam, I Duv. 
(Ky.) 403, but that if the legatee died before the statute was passed, his 
descendant would not take under the statute, but that the legacy would lapse .. 
Murphy v. M cKeon, 53 N. J. Eq. 4o6; Harrison's Estate, IO Pa. Dist. 45. 
A more serious question arises in the· second conclusion reached by the 
court. 'I-hat republication makes a lapsed .legacy a void legacy seems never 
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to have been the subject of an actual decision before, though there are dicta 
stating as much in some English cases. See Winter v. Winter, 5 Hare 3o6; 
In re Fraser (1904), l Ch. 726. The former case was identical in facts with 
the present in so far as they are pertinent to our question. The court cited 
no authorities and held that legacies to persons dead when the will was made 
were within the purview of the English statute. This effect of republication 
seems hardly tenable under the English statute where, by its very terms, the 
legatee is deemed to be alive until after the death of the testator. See Johnson 
v. Johnson (supra); Eager v. Furnivall (supra). The statute does not seem 
to be involved in the latter case and in all the authorities cited by the court 
the will was given an operative effect. In most of the cases in which the 
courts have mentioned republication it has been to give the will an operative 
effect that it would not have had without republication,-to make it valid 
if the prior execution was defectiYe or revoked, to pass after acquired pro-
perty, etc. Rood on Wills, Sec. 3g6-7, and rarely if every as in In re Matthew's 
Estate (supra) to prevent a will operating which would have had an opera-
tive effect without republication. See Mann v. Hyde (supra) and Harrison's 
Estate (supra). The very same court that decided the principal case held 
a gift to charity which the statute declared void if made within thirty days 
of the testator's death was not invalidated by republication within that 
period. McCauley's Estate, 138 Calif. 432, 546. 
Admitting that the republication deprived the will of all benefit from prior 
publication only, does it follow that the descendants of a legatee dead when 
the will was made cannot take? Several courts have held the descendants 
of legatees dead when the will was made take by force of the statute. 
Lewis v. Corbin, 195 Mass. 520; Nutter v. Vickery, 64 Me. 490, 4g8; Wild-
berger v. Cheek, 94 Va. 517; Mower v. Orr, 7 Hare 472; Minter's Appeal, 
40 Pa. St. III. Other courts have held they do not take. Pegues v. Pegues, 
70 S. C. 544; Lindsay v. Pleasants, 39 N. C. 320; Scales v. Scales, 6 Jones 
Eq. (N. C.) 163; Moss v. Heisley, 6o Tex.¢; Billingsly l. Tongue, 9 Md. 
575; Almy v. Jones, 17 R. I. 265, 270. The phrasing of the statutes may 
reconcile some of the apparent conflict. In Lindsay v. Pleasants, Scales v. 
Scales, Moss v. Helsley, the statutes referred specifically to lapsed legacies. 
In Billingsly v. Tongue, the statute read "no devise shall lapse or fail of 
taking effect by reason of the death of the devisee in the lifetime of the 
testator." In Almy v. Jones the statute applied only when a person "having 
a devise or bequest shall die before the testator." This language was held 
inapplicable to one who was dead before the devise or bequest was made. 
It is to be noted that the language of the Civil Code of California, sec. 1310 
(supra) is broad enough to include both cases before and after the making 
of the will. Statutes of this latter type have been held to include both. See 
cases cited supra. Statutes of more restricted wording have been held to 
extend to legatees dead when the will was made. See Mower v. Orr (supra), 
Minter's Appeal (supra). Pegues v. Pegues (supra), however, is in accord 
with the principal case. The cases of Doe on the Demise of Hearn v. Roe, 
4 Houst. (Del.) 20, and Stennett v. Hall, 74 Ia. 279, cited by the court, do 
not involve the statutes. R. A. F. 
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CoNTING~NT GIFTS AND INCORPORATION BY RsFEMN~.-The courts have 
had great difficulty in reconciling certain contingent gifts with the statutes 
requiring wills to be in writing duly executed. At first glance there appears 
no inconsistency, but in practice troubles accumulate. 
Before there were any statutes concerning wills the validity of contin-
gent devises and bequests was admitted; also the validity of a provision the 
effect of which was to depend on a writing to be drawn later, and even by 
one other than the testator. Robt. Crody, being about to die, called 1iis 
friends John and Thomas, saying: "Ye be the men in whom I have great 
trust, especially that the will which I now declare you will faithfully per-
form, and therefore (inasmuch as a devise of land would be void for viola-
tion of the law of tenures) I now make livery to you of the house in which 
I now lie and all my land in this town, to hold to you and your heirs, in full 
confidence that you will make a good estate to my wife Alice for life, then 
to my daughter Margaret and the heirs of her body, but if she be dead 
without issue, then to my heirs." And the chancellor decreed accordingly. 
About 1438, I Calendar of Proceedings in Chancery (Hen. VI), xliii. This 
was a mere trust; but lands being devisable by special custom, a testator de-
vised that on a certain event his executors should sell; and though the lands 
were not devised, but descended to the heir, all the judges of England in 
the Exchequer Chamber assembled agreed that the executors might sell, for 
descent-cast takes away entry on a disseizor, but not powers, conditions, 
etc. 4 Jenk. Cent. case 751 A. D. I498. In l43I, Babington, C. J., said: 
"The nature of a devise where lands are devisable is that one may devise 
..that the land shall be sold by the executors, and this is good, as has been 
said, and it is marvelous law; but this is the nature of a devise, and de-
; vises have been used at all times in this form; and so one may have lawful 
freehold from another who had nothing, just as one may have fire from flint 
and yet there is no fire in .the flint." Farington v. Darrel, (143I), Y. B. 9 
Hen. 6, .23b. A man devised land to his wife for life, remainder to B in 
fee, and that the wife might make leases for six years; and a lease made 
by the wife after she had married again was held good against B. Ha"is 
v. Graham, (1638), I Roll Ahr. J.29. A testator directed his executors to 
select one of his nephews as his beneficiary, and the chancellor ordered 
them to do it. Mosely v. Mosely, (I673), Finch Ch. 53. 
In this state of the law it was declared by statute that devises would be 
void unless in writing signed by the testator, and subscribed in his presence 
by three credible witnesses. 29 Car. II, c. 3, sec. 5, (I677). Under this 
statute it was held that a man might by devise charge his land with the pay-
ment of his debts, and such charge would .include subsequent debts; that he 
might by devise duly executed charge his land with payment of his legacies. 
and that such charge bound his land to pay legacies created by a later will 
not executed in such form as to be valid as a devise of land. Inchiquin v. 
O'Brien, (I744), not reported, Hannis v. Packer, (I752), Ambl. 556. 
But when a man later devised his lands to trustees upon trusts to be de-
clared by him by any deed executed by him before his death, the Lord Chan-
cellor Loughborough, on the advice of Wilson and Buller, JJ., held the 
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trusts declared by such deed were void; because the deed was intended to 
operate only in conjunction with the previously executed devise, was there-
fore testamentary in character, and did not comply with the statute pre-
scribing how devises should be executed. Habergham v. Vincent, (1793), 
2 Ves. Jr. 204. 
The result of this decision was that a man who had duly executed a 
devise charging his land with the payment of debts and legacies, could add 
new charges without any formality at all, by merely contracting debts or 
declaring legacies by word of mouth only; but he could not do so by a 
duly executed deed even though he had in his formally executed devise ex-
pressly provided for that event. He could by his devise authorize another 
to do for him after his death what he could not reserve to himself the power 
to do while he lived. He could not by his devise reserve to himself the 
power to do that by deed which he could have done by deed without 
making any devise at all. He could not reserve to himself the power 
to do by deed what he might authorize another to do without deed. He 
might by devise charge his land with specialty debts which would in-
clude those incurred afterwards ; but he could not by devise charge his lands 
with such sums as he should by deed later specify even though the later 
charges turned out to be only these very debts. He might by devise charge 
his land with a legacy of £100 to each servant in his employ at the time of 
his death; but he could not charge his land by devise with £100 to such of 
his servants at his death as he should by deed specify. But he could do 
that very thing by charging his land by devise with payment of his specialty 
debts, and later giving to such of his servants as he pleased a bond for £100 
payable at his death, if they should then be in his employ.· It is submitted 
that the decision cannot possibly be reconciled with th!: accepted law of 
that day; and that the difficulties of the courts in endeavoring to follow 
that decision since are due to that fact. 
The logic on which the court proceeded in Habergham v. Vincent sounds 
very plausible. It was said that the testator cannot reserve to himself the 
power to devise his property in a manner which the statute declares to be 
void; and that he cannot by his devise which does not take effect till he is 
dead give himself a power to arise before the instrument creating it be-
comes operative. The difficulty with this logic is that it assumes that he 
is attempting to do so, that the result can be reached in no other way, 
that a devise which is duly executed cannot deal with future events-a 
thing that is permitted in all dispositions by will. It is not confined to con-
tingent devises and bequests. A devise to my brother Thomas, although on 
its face absolute, is contingent on Thomas surviving me. A devise of Black-
acre is contingent on not disposing of the land before death. If I bequeath 
my bonds to A and my bank deposits to B, I may at will, without any legal 
formality at all, vary, revoke, and renew these bequests as many times as I 
please. AU I need do is to sell a bond and deposit the proceeds, buy a bond 
and draw a check on the account for the amount. These propositions have 
never been doubted in. any court. Devising my lands to such uses as I shall 
hereafter by deed declare is not in substance distinguishable from a devise 
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to my executors to pay my debts, or to such wife as shall survive me. It is 
submitted that the power to make a testamentary instrument at all neces-
sarily includes the power to make the effect of the disposition depend on 
the contingencies arising between the making of the will and the death of 
the testator. Inasmuch as the result must depend on the contingencies not 
mentioned, expressly mentioning the contingencies does not hurt the devise; 
ani:l as devises have always been sustained in which the testator expressly 
made the effect depend on contingencies happening between the time he 
made the devise and his death, it cannot be material that the contingency 
he mentions is a writing made by him instead of any other act. To hold 
otherwise is to sustain a disposition expressly made contingent. on a future 
act, and to defeat a disposition made dependent on a future writing, and 
yet a writing is an act. The distinction requires us to deny effect to a writ-
ing made by· the testator while alive and give effect against his heir to a 
similar writing made by another after the testator is dead, if the testator 
authorized him to make it. 
The New York Court of Appeals some years ago held that a power given 
by will to a daughter to dispose by will, with a gift to her executors if she 
predecease the testator, entitled the legatees under the daughter's will made 
"after that of the parent to take, though the power to the daughter lapsed by 
her death before the death of the parent. "\Vhile, therefore, it may not be 
possible to sustain the power of appointment as such, and so enable Sarah's 
devisees and legatees to take the one-fifth by force of her will, it is possible 
to see in the will of the father a clear intent to prevent a lapse, and avoid 
a partial intestacy by carrying over the one-fifth which she did not take, · 
through her executors, to those whom she should name as devisees and lega-
tees of her property, and in the proportions by her directed." Piffard's 
Estate, (I888), III N. Y. 410. The same court has just followed that de-
cision in Powless Will, (I9I8). 
If a testator may make the disposition of his property under his will 
depend on a writing to be made by so111eone else later and not effective as 
an appointment under a power, why may he not make the .disposition depend 
on a writing to be made by himself later? J. R. R. 
SuBS'l'ITU'l'IONAL GIFTS To CLASSES.-In some recent cases we have fresh 
reminder of the futility of Sir William Grant's distinction between original 
and substitutional gifts, a rule over which courts have quarreled .and dis-
agreed ever since it was promulgated, and which never was applied to the 
exclusion of anyone without disappointing the wish of the testator. In 
speaking of this rule in Re HickeJ,•, [I9I7], I Ch. D. 6oI, 6o4, Neville, J., 
says: "The alleged principle seems to be that the meaning of the word 'sub-
stitute' involves the idea of replacing one thing by another. One cannot 
'substitute' something for nothing. The proposition appears to me axiomatic 
but not very illuminating. If the testator uses the word its meaning must 
affect the construction of his will; but where the court uses it, it is merely 
a mode of expressing a view of the construction already formed." 
In view of the endless variety of expression and the hopeless confusion 
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of decisions, it has been said that the means of distin~ishing the original 
from the substitutional legacy is the length of the chancellor's foot, and the 
liveliness of his imagination, per Barrows, ]., in Wheeler v. Allan, (1866), 
54 Me. 232, 234 
The case in which the rule was first announced was this: an immediate 
gift to "each and every the child and children of my brother and sisters 
which shall be living at the time of my death; but if any child or children 
of my said brother and sister or any of them shall happen to die in my lifetime 
and leave any issue, the legacy or legacies hereby intended for such child 
or children so dying shall be for his, her, or their issue;" which Sir Wil-
liam Grant, M. R. held did not give a right to take to the children of one dead 
when the will was made, because "the nephews and nieces here are the 
primary legatees; nothing whatever is given to their issue except by way 
of substitution; in order to claim, therefore, under the will, these substituted 
legatees must point out the original legatees in whose place they demand 
to stand; but of the nephews and nieces of the testator, none could have 
taken besides those who were living at the date of the will." Christopherson 
v. Na)•lor, (1816), I Meriv. 319. 
If we correct his honor's baseless assump.tion that the legatees are ascer-
tained at the date of the will instead of at the death of the testator, the 
whole fabric of his argument is destroyed. Moreover, no rule was ever 
worse applied than this one in the very case in which it originated. Taking 
his honor's view of the case, the original legatees are "children of my 
brother and sisters that shall be living at the time of my death", which 
would exclude children of a brother dying after the date of the will but 
before the death of the testator, and leave no possibility of anyone being 
a substituted legatee. Further, to impute to the testator an intention that the 
right of issue of a nephew or niece to take shall depend on the inconsequen-
tial fact that the nephew or niece died the day before or the day after the 
will was written, is to read into the will an intention so capricious and fan-
tastic, that it is doubtful if ever a testator entertain,ed it. Testators always 
have in mind the time when their wills will take effect whatever be the form 
of expression; but here that is the form of expression. 
If the testator had said he gave to the nephews living at his death and 
the issue of those then dead, it is cle.ar that the issue would take as primary 
donees, and not by way of substitution for anyone. It would be an original 
gift to a composite class; living nephews and the issue of dead nephews. 
It is claimed that the meaning is different if the testator says: "I give Black-
acre to my nephews, and if any nephew shall die before me, his issue shall 
take his share." This is about as strong as any of the cases; but who 
would suspect that the testator intended to make a point of the future tense 
"shall die"? 
In J.l!orrison's Est., (1891), 139 Pa. 3o6, the words were: "I have a num-
ber of nephews and nieces living in different parts of the country, and 
whose names and places of residence I am not able to state accurately; to 
each of them I bequeath the sum of $10,000; if any of them should die be-
fore me, the legacy of those so dyi.ng to be paid to their children." The 
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court held children of nephews dead when the will was written were not 
entitled; yet no one could doubt that the testator intended to include them. 
In Cochran's Est., (1913), IO Del. Ch. 134, 85 Atl. 1070, the court went 
so far as to impute such an intent to exclude grandchildren of the testator 
on the words "shall be dead", which certainly is equally and strictly true 
of those dead at the writing of the will. The words were "unto such of 
my children as may survive me, and if any of my said children shall be 
dead leaving a child or children, then to such child or children the share 
the parent would have taken if living." It is not possible to make children 
of a child dying before the testator substituted legatees under this will; for 
the persons in whose place they are supposed to take are "such of my chil· 
dren as may survive me." If the supposed original legatees survive the 
testator they themselves take. Those who do not survive the testator do 
not fall within the class at all, and therefore no one can stand in their stead . 
. A more rational interpretation was made in holding children of a brother 
who was dead when the will was written to· take under the- words: "to be 
divided equally between my brothers and sister of the full and half blood 
equally, but if any be then deceased such share to go to his or her children 
equally." Anderson v. Wilson, (1912), 155 Iowa 415, in which the decisions 
English and American are reviewed at considerable length. 
Re Hickey, (1917), I Ch. D. 6o1, was a legacy to "the descendants of A 
or their descendants living at my death"; in which the court held that chil-
dren of a descendant dead when the will was written were entitled to take. 
"While Christopherson v. Naylor, (1816), l Meriv. 319, is now too firmly 
established in England to be overruled there, and can only be distinguished 
to avoid its operation (M1esther, fa re, (1890), 43 Ch. D. 56g, C. A.); courts 
here cannot consistently follow it after holding that the statutes declaring 
that legacies to descendants "who shall die before the testator shall be paid 
to their issue if any,'' entitle issue of members of a class dying before the 
will was made. S~e Chenault v. Chenault, (1888), 88 Ky. 83; Bray v. Pullen,. 
(1892), 84 Me. 185; Jamison v. Hay, (1870), 46 Mo. 546. J. R. R. 
AcQUIRSMJSNT 011 TITLE BY A W:u.LFUL TRESPASSER AND CoMPISNSATloN FOR 
THIS TRISSPASSISIS.-The interaction of the basic maxim_ of substantive law, 
that no man may be deprived of his property without his consent, and the 
correlative maxim of adjective law, that the courts will give ~act compen-
sation for property taken or destroyed, together with the more or less me-
chanical rules of damages depending upon the form of action used, have 
in their outcome gone far toward justifying the somewhat grandiloquent 
utterance of our legal forbears of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
that the "Common Law is the perfection of human wisdom." The final stage 
in this development is shown in the late cases of Polk County v. Parker, 
(Iowa, Dec., 1916), 100 N. W. 320 and Warren Stove Co. v. Hardy, et al., 
(Ark., Oct., 1917), rg8 S. W. 99. 
Since the decision in Wetherbee v. Green has domesticated the relative 
value rule in English law there has been much controversy and litigation 
over the ~atio of disparity which will effect a transfer of title. The ratio 
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in this case was twenty-eight to one. Judge Cooley afterwards, in Isle 
Royale Mining Co v. Hertin, (1877), 37 Mich. 332, said that a ratio of three 
to two was not sufficient. In Eaton v. Langley, (1898), 65 Ark. 448, a ratio 
of six to two was held inadequate, while in Loi'is Werner Stave Co. v. Pick-
erif, (1909), 55 Tex. C. A. 632, a ratio of three to one did effect a transfer 
of title. We may conclude from this that the disparity must be so great 
that it will "shock the conscience of the court" to apply the old common 
law rule for the protection of the original holder of title, though the exact 
point at which this will occur seems not very well determined. 
When the bulwark of title yields for the benefit of the innocent tres-
passer, it does not leave the original holder of title without a remedy. He 
is to be made whole by adequate compensation for what he has lost and, 
in case the thing converted has increased in value for any reason, the 
amount of compensation is affected by the form of action that may be used 
in the suit for recovery. If trover or trespass is used, the recovery should 
logically be the value at the time and place of conversion. If detinue or 
replevin is used with the alternative recovery in damages, the amount should 
be the value at the time of the suit. In case the property appropriated has 
not been increased in value enough to effect a change of title and the suit 
is brought under the formless action of the code, these several conflicting 
principles are reconciled by allowing an inadvertent trespasser to keep all 
that has been added to the finished product by his own efforts, while the 
trespassee gets back the value of his title at the time of the conversion plus 
any increment of the market, if such there be. Eaton v. Langley, (18g8), 65 
Ark. 448. It is to the credit of the courts in some of our non-code states 
that the same equitable result is reached whether the form of action be 
trover, as in Winchester v. Craig, (1876), 33 Mich. 205, "or replevin, as in 
G11stfo v. Embury-Clark Lumber Co., (1go6), 145 Mich. IOI. 
All of this equitable relaxation of strict maxims of law and rules of 
practice has, however, been made for the benefit of the inadvertent tres-
passer, but in the first of the instant cases there enters that nefandissimus 
Germam1s of the Common Law, the willful trespasser. In Polk County v. 
Parker, supra, a city assessor took "pages from a discarded county plat 
book and, outside of office hours, put on this paper valuable maps and plats. 
When he left the office he took away the book with the maps "and plats. 
The county sued out a writ of replevin and secured possession of them. 
They were worth about $1,500. It was held that title had passed to the 
willful trespasser, thus answering in the affirmative the question that has 
been asked ever since the decision in Wetherbee v. Green, namely, will the 
rule in that case apply if the trespass is intentional, the very great disparity 
between the title converted and the labor and skill added being sufficient to 
"shock the conscience of the court into a decision favorable to the wicked 
trespasser? This, of course, reverses the acknowledged principle of the 
civil law, adopted in the case of Silsbury v. M'Coon, (1850), 3 Comst. (N. 
Y.) 379, that "a willful wrong doer acquires no property in the goods of 
another, either by the wrongful taking or by any change wrought in them by 
his labor or skill, however great the change may be." By a natural exten-
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sion in the principle of this last mentioned case even the bo11a fide purchaser 
for value from the willful trespasser cannot convey what he himself does 
not have. Wooden Ware Company v. United States, (1882), 106 U. S. 432, 
represents the weight of authority on this point, though Railway Co. v. 
Hutchins, (1877), 32 Ohio St. 584. protests strongly against this on the 
ground that "the estoppel, so to call it, being created by fraud or wrong, 
exists only against the one guilty of that fraud or wrong, which the pur-
chaser is not." • 
In the Arkansas case of Warren Stave Co. v. Hardy, supra, the facts 
bring before the court all of the conflicting principles rehearsed above. The 
agent of the appellant had bought stave bolts from one Jolly. Jolly had 
bought the standing oak timber out of which the bolts were made from one 
Turner, who claimed to own the land on which the timber was growing, but 
refused to tell how he got title thereto. Jolly had cut and removed the 
trees and sold the bolts to the appellant's agent. The title to the land on 
which $e timber stood was not in Turner, as he claimed, but belonged to 
Hardy, the appellee. The standing timber was worth between $2.50 and $3 
a cord. The stave bolts from $25 to $so a cord, depending on the sort of 
.staves for which they were used. It was held, that Jolly was a willful tres-
passer. As such he should, according to rule, acquire no right or interest 
in the timber, and the purchaser from him, though innocent; should ac-
quire no greater right than the trespasser had. It was further held that the 
defendant was liable for the value of the stave bolts on the market less the 
charges of transportation, and not merely for the value of the logs before 
being worked up. Since the question of damages had arisen as an inci-
dent of the suit to quiet title to the land, the question of the transfer of 
title of the timber after its conversion into personalty did not come up, but 
the result of the decision is that while the injured party has received full 
compensation for his title, as though sold on the best market, the willful 
trespasser has acquired title to the chattel converted, when the ratio between 
the value of the chattel taken and the finished product is about ten to one, 
and bas succeeded in transferring this right to the innocent purchaser who 
is allowed to keep this title on payment to the trespassee of the value of the 
chattel at the time of conversion, plus such a sum as may have been added 
to the converted property by any increment in the market for staves or from 
any "other causes independent of the acts of the defendant'', cf. Weymouth 
v. Chi and N. W. Ry. Co., (1863), 17 Wis. 572. Everybody has received his 
just dues, the various maxims of law act in unison and lawyers' law is in 
harmony with justice. J. H. D . 
. 
Punr.rc UTrr.ITY V ALUATION-Gornc-CoNCERN V Ar.ur: rn RATE MAKING.-
'Vbat is the effect of a city ordinance which proposes to a public utility com-
pany the terms on which it may dispose of its product to the users, but 
which is rejected by the company? As to a company not yet doing business 
it is clear that the ordinance when rejected becomes a mere legai nullity. 
It never was more than an offer that might ripen into a binding contract 
by acceptance. That it is by no means a nullity as to a utility actually oper-
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ating in the city after the expiration of its franchise and as a mere ten~t 
by sufferance of the streets, is held in City and County of Denver v. Denver 
Union Water Co. Supreme Court of the U. S. Nos. 294 and 295, decided 
March 4, 1918. The city of Denver may well be surprised to learn that by 
passing an ordinance which the company rejected it was considerably worse 
off than if it had done nothing. In effect, by passing an ordinance fixing 
the maximum cha=ges permitted to be made by the company "during the 
time it shall furthe. act as a water carrier and tenant by sufferance of said 
streets", the city gave to the plant a value that made the rates illegal and 
defeated the ordinance. That any unaccepted ordinance should have such 
an effect is indeed startling, the more so that in this case the city was care-
ful to expressly recite in the preamble that the company had for four years 
been without a franchise and a mere tenant by sufferance of the streets and 
that this enactment ·was made without recognizing the right of the company 
to occupy the streets or to continue its service. 
In Detroit· United Railway v. City of Detroit, 229 U. S., 39, 46, it was 
held that a street railroad authorized to operate in the streets of a city for a 
definite time, within a reasonable time after the expiration of such term 
may be required to remove its tracks and other property from the streets. 
This of course would apply equally to the mains and other property of a 
water .,;ompany after the expiration of its franchise. The city of Denver had 
the undoubted legal right upon the expiration of the franchise in 1910, or at 
any. time thereafter, upon reasonable notice (go days in the case of the De-
troit United Railway) to require the water company to remove itself and its 
'ilroperty from the streets. In such case the property value would be mere 
junk value, and the rates in the ordinance in question would be a much more 
favorable option to the company than an order to vacate. ' 
Legally this seems clear, but practically it is very uncertain what are the 
rights that may be realized. To require this vacation would ruin the com-
pany. Equally it would ruin the city. It would require the city three years 
to install new works, even if not delayed by legal battles and elections. Mean-
time the city must have water. The city is under no legal obligation to 
purchase the works even if it has an option to do so. Denver v. New York 
Trust Co., 229 U. S. 123, 142. No more is the company under legal obliga-
tion to furnish water. If it does do so it is entitled to a reasonable return 
on "fair value of the property being used by it for the public convenience". 
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466. But what is the fair value of a plant that 
may at any moment be ordered out? Is it junk value? The court holds 
that the point is not properly raised by the pleadings, the master's report, the 
exceptions, or the assignments of error, but supposing it were properly 
raised then by the true intent and meaning of the ordinance (which the com-
pany was fighting and had not in any respect accepted) "new rights were con-
ferred upon the company of such a nature that in considering the effect of the 
provisions limiting rates, the plant must be valued not as junk but as prop-
erty useful and in use in the public service." This new right the court con-
strues as "the grant of a new franchise of indefinite duration, terminable 
either by the city or by the company at such time and under such circum-
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stances as may be consistent with the duty that both owe to the inhabitants 
of Denver". \Ve may agree with the court that to regard the plant as a mere 
junk heap is "highly penal and destructive in its effect". This perhaps justifies 
basing1rates on the fair value of the plant as in active service. It may be that 
if its value is to be-fixed on the cost-of-production-less-depreciation theory an 
allowance should be made for that uncertain and highly speculative element, 
going-concern value. See 15 MICH. L. IU:v. 205. But that ~his rejected ordi-
nance should have any such effect or any effect seems wrolly unnatural, atid 
contrary to every legal principle. The court seems to have caught at this 
straw to work out the equitable result of "preserving the substantial rights 
o_f both parties". It is extraordinary that an ordinance held to be ineffectual 
for e\•ery purpose for which it was passed becomes effectual for the very 
purpose for which it expressly states it was not passed. This is indeed a 
legal boomerang that injures not the opponent and spends all its force on 
the hurler. Possibly the city of Denver deserved the blow: 
The explanation probably is this. The position of the public and the 
public utility after the e.-.,;:piration of the franchise is a difficult one. The 
utility has no further right in the streets, the city has no right to use the 
property, Detroit United Railway v. Detroit, 229 U. S. 39. But neither can 
let go the other and the courts naturally look for a settlement to work out 
substantial justice. This case indicates a strong inclination of the court to 
hold that so long as the city continues the use the rate should be based on 
the same valuation (with the exception of a possible allowance for fran-
chise value) that would be the base in fixing rates before the expiration of 
the franchise. In this division the court catches at this ineffective ordinance 
as an excuse for avoiding what would otherwise amount to a forfeiture. 
Whether the same conclusion will be reached in future cases where no such 
excuse exists remains to be seen. 
Three justices are unable to agree to such reasoning. Justice Holmes 
writing the dissenting opinion admitted that perhaps an instrument could be 
framed that granted while it said that it did not. He thought the ordi-
nance meant no more than that the company must accept the city's rates or 
:Stop. As it could be stopped by the city out and out, it could be stopped 
·unless a certain price was paid. Ashley v. Ryan, 153 U. S. 436, 443, 444, 
.citing Patil v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168. However ruinous it might be to both 
parties to stop service, the law knows nothing but legal rights, and the rela-
tions of these parties after the expiration of the franchise are independent 
of legal rights. Under the circumstances of the case he thought it hard to 
see how property could be confiscated by the establishment of almost any 
rate, and therefore the ordinances can hardly violate the due process clause 
of the 14th Amendment Appleton Water Works Co. v. Railroad.Com., 154 
Wis. 121. 
The case throws no light on the proper theory of valuation of public 
utilities. All parties accepted the cost-of-reproduction-less-depreciation theory 
and no issue was made on that. vVhy going-concern value was fixed at 
$800,000 instead of $iOO,ooo, or $1,500,000, or more or less, is, as nearly al-
ways happens in such cases, quite unexplained. Appleto1i Water Works Co. 
v. Railroad Com., 154 Wis. 121, 148, 15 MICH. L. IU:v. 205, 218. E. C. G. 
